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This study reconsiders the empirical question of whether men’s earnings in-
crease because of children. Large Norwegian register data are used for brother and
twin pairs who are followed over their life cycle from their first entry into the labour
market. The data permit family-fixed effects to be modeled in various ways, as well
as observing earnings growth before and after having children. The simple condi-
tional correlation between children and earnings is positive. When only variation
from between-sibling differences is used, the earnings effect post entry into first-
fatherhood declines. The effect becomes small and non-significant when we use
twins.
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1 Introduction
Women traditionally take greater responsibility for rearing children, with many ar-
ticles having shown that women’s earnings drop when they have children. Part of
this drop captures decreased labour supply post childbirth, through periods of leave
or reduced hours of work, as well as the depreciation of human capital during leave
periods. The unexplained drop that studies in this literature find even after control-
ling for many productivity-related factors is consistent with several explanations;
for example, compensating wage differentials if mothers trade more family friendly
working conditions for wages after childbirth.1 Evidence on men’s earnings and
children is scarce, and the general finding is that men’s earnings increase after hav-
ing children. This seems a paradox in light of the standard economic explanations
applied in the literature on women. Traditionally, fathers do not adjust their labour
supply to care for their children2 and therefore we would not expect an effect of
children. Hence, this finding questions either standard economic explanations or
previous empirical findings.
This study contributes new empirical evidence concerning the effect of children
on men’s earnings, using register data on Norway on large samples of brothers
and twins who are followed over most of their life cycle. We estimate flexible log
earnings regressions where the unobserved heterogeneity component is common
to brothers. The main result is that when we use variation from the comparison
of men’s earnings to their twin brothers, the effect of children is not significantly
different from zero; the point estimate is +2 per cent per year. This is the mean
effect post entry into first fatherhood.
1Other explanations are reduced work effort (Becker, 1985) and employer discrimination. For
empirical studies, see e.g. Bertrand, et al. 2010, Waldfogel (1998), Joshi et al. (1999), and Anderson,
et al. (2002), Gupta and Smith (2002).
2Although this statement is (still) true, the Nordic countries are exceptions, having introduced
a paternity leave quota, Norway in 1993, that has led to some fathers taking 1-4 months of leave
during the first year after the birth of the child. Nonetheless, virtually all fathers work full-time.
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It is important to understand the costs and gains from having children because
they are directly related to the demand for children, as well as the design of policies.
Examples are divorce settlements and pension schemes that compensate mothers
for time out of work due to caring for their own children. Costs through labour
adjustments related to children are understood as an important contributor to the
gender wage gap3, which policy makers try to diminish. Fathers have also attracted
increasing interest in this debate, because we can observe from the data that men
have increased their weight on family values (see e.g. Goldin 2006), as well as their
involvement in child care.
It is complicated to interpret correlations of children and earnings as a causal
effect of children because parenthood might be endogenous with respect to earnings
or correlated with unobserved factors. Credible instrumental variables that can ad-
dress these potential problems are difficult to find for fertility. IV has been applied
to estimate the earnings effect of the increase in number of children from two to
three (Angrist and Evans, 1998), teenage pregnancy (Hotz et al., 2005), and delay
of motherhood (Miller, 2011). A caveat of these estimates is that effects at partic-
ular parity may not be generalizable to other parities. The most common approach
in the literature has been to apply fixed-effects estimation exploiting longitudinal
panel data following individuals over time.
In this study, we follow this literature but apply an alternative approach to esti-
mate the mean effect of children on earnings. We compare men’s outcomes to those
of their brothers or twin brothers over the most important part of their life cycle
and before and after entry into fatherhood. We estimate the effect of first entry into
fatherhood, allowing the effect to be non-linear. The variation identifying the effect
of children comes from pairs of brothers where one becomes a father and the other
3Statistics show that unadjusted male-female earnings differentials still remain significant, be-
tween 15 and 23 percent, and have remained surprisingly stable in many countries over recent
decades. Blau and Kahn (2006) show the slowing down of convergence for the U.S. in the 1990s.
For an international overview, see Tijdens and Van Klaveren (2012).
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never does. While this exercise is in itself interesting, it also potentially addresses
some problems in this literature. We exploit that brothers are genetically more sim-
ilar than randomly selected men from the population and hence the comparison of
earnings, holding standard characteristics constant, reduces the heterogeneity prob-
lem. We estimate various family fixed factor models that also control for the age
differences between brothers, to account for more heterogeneity in family back-
ground. Heterogeneity in family background within families may capture nurture
effects, such as parenting skills. Using twins offers the advantage that we directly
control for family fixed factors, time fixed factors and individual fixed factors. Fur-
thermore, we extend existing earnings models in this literature by controlling for
the fact that men who remain childless and men who become fathers-at-some-point
may be on different earnings paths from first entry into the labour market; that is
when we compare the earnings paths of childless men to those of fathers-at-some-
point even before they enter fatherhood.
To implement the approach we use a large, high quality Norwegian registry
data set of the population of brothers and twins born during the period 1955 to 1965
and followed until 2005. Core to our study is that we observe complete employment
and earnings histories from first entry into the labour market. This also includes the
complete timing of births histories for every individual in the population, employ-
ment and earnings before and after childbirths and the link to match brothers. These
data offer several advantages over previous studies. The literature on the effect of
children on earnings has relied on much smaller samples, mostly, from survey data
that do not permit to follow every worker over the complete life cycle in the labour
market, observe exact timing of births and complete fertility, and match siblings.
Related to our approach, Simonsen and Skipper (2010) exploit Danish data on a
sample of twins in 2006, but they estimate more restricted models than we do and
cannot distinguish childless men from not yet fathers. They find a significant wage
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premium for men. Neumark and Korenman (1994) analyzed the effect of children
on earnings using a relatively small sample of sisters from the NLS for the early
1980s. They did not analyze men. Our approach is also related to studies that ex-
ploit genetically identical twins to estimate the marriage premium (Antonovics and
Town, 2004; Krashinsky, 2004). In this literature samples are often small and a
much discussed problem is attenuation bias because of measurement error in sur-
vey data (Bound and Solon, 1999). Therefore, the data we use have an advantage
since register data contain process collected information and a large number of in-
dividuals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of why children may have an effect on earnings for men. Section 3
presents background on the Norwegian labour market and institutions, and the de-
scription of the data and summary statistics. Section 4 outlines the empirical frame-
work. Section 5 presents the empirical results. This is followed by the discussion
of the empirical approach and a summary of the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Men’s earnings and having children
It is complicated to interpret empirical correlations of children and earnings as a
causal effect of children, because parenthood may be endogenous with respect to
earnings or correlated with unobserved fixed factors. Human capital theory would
predict no effect in the periods post becoming a father since, as the data show, men
do not typically take time off to care for children and tend to work full-time for most
of their working lives.4
4In general, male labor force participation rates in industrialized countries have declined since the
1970s, while the work pattern whereby men work full-time has remained unchanged (see Blundell
and McCurdy, 1999). Studies using U.S. time-use data have shown that time allocation between
leisure and work has changed somewhat, with more hours allocated towards leisure.
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Given that husbands’ and wives’ labor market outcomes are interdependent,
we would expect the reallocation of mothers’ time and effort after childbirth from
market to home to be accompanied by some labor market response among fathers.
Two explanations discussed in the literature suggest that there is a causal effect of
children for men. If the mothers specialize more in home production, this can lead
to an increased specialization of fathers in market production, particularly, if moth-
ers also take over other household activities previously conducted by the partner
because of economies of scale effects. An earnings increase can also be caused by
preferential treatment by employers of fathers, or positive discrimination. For the
U.S., studies have shown that part of the child premium is related to increased hours
of work (Pencavel, 1986; Lundberg and Rose, 2002).
A third explanation is that earnings advantages of men with children compared
to childless men may capture decisions made earlier in life related to the plan to
become a father. This explanation suggests that the correlation between children
and earnings is due to omitted variable bias. If men expect to make gains in the
labour market after child birth, then it is optimal for them to already more invest
into their career before they become fathers. There are several potential reasons
for why initial earnings and returns to experience may be relatively higher for men
who become fathers at some point. For instance, the planning of the timing of births
could contribute to the observed patterns (Bergstrom and Schoeni, 1996). Moreover,
men who plan to become partners may also self-select into higher-track occupations
(Gould, 2008).
A related question is whether cohabitation or marriage even before actually be-
coming a father explains the relatively higher earnings growth of fathers-at-some-
point (Peters and Siow, 2002).5 One hypothesis is that marriage itself leads to
5Studies of the marriage premium in male wages provide little insight into the effect of hav-
ing children, since either the effect of having children is not separately reported (Korenmark and
Neuman, 1991; Gray, 1997), or is reported to be insignificant (Loh, 1996).
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gender-specific household specialization, whereby men specialize more in market
work and women in home production. An alternative hypothesis is that men with
relatively high productivity-related skills are more likely to marry. A large group of
international studies has shown that married men earn between 10 and 40 per cent
more than comparable single men (Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Ginther et al.,
2001). However, the precise nature of the effects remains unclear. Time-use data
offers little support for the specialization hypothesis (Hersch and Stratton, 2000).
Time-use data suggests that gender-specific household specialization is not related
to cohabitation or marriage, but rather to the presence of children and particularly
to when more time is spent on child care (see Dribe and Stanfors, 2009; Hodges and
Budig, 2010).
Most previous studies on the effect of children on men’s earnings rely on indi-
vidual fixed effects estimates, ranging between 3 and 10 per cent per year, varying
somewhat depending on the country and model specification (see Lundberg and
Rose (2000; 2002), Pencavel (1986), Waldfogel (1998), Killewald (2013), Glauber
(2008), Hodges and Budig (2010) for the US, Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz
(1990) for Sweden and van Soest et al. (1990) for the Netherlands). Only a limited
number of studies have looked at both the effect of having children and the effect
of marriage (Loughran et al. (2009), Hodges and Budig (2010), Hundley (2000),
Lundberg and Rose (2002)).
Our study contributes new empirical evidence to this literature by using new
data and estimating a more flexible earnings model. We investigate the extent
to which controlling for family fixed factors in different ways in earnings equa-
tions can help to account for unobserved heterogeneity. For comparison, ordinary
least squares and individual fixed effect estimates of the effect of children are pre-
sented. The specification allows the effect of children to be non-linear, whereby
post-childbirth earnings may shift upward and vary with work experience since en-
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try into fatherhood. We also test whether the effect of children works through first
childbirth or higher parity child births and whether the effect of children captures
effects through marriage.
A limitation of our study is that we cannot fully account for the fact that, if the
timing of fatherhood is anticipated, this may affect earnings and earnings growth
before entry into fatherhood. We address this problem in two ways. First, poten-
tially self-selection into the group of fathers works through family fixed effects.
In this case, family fixed factors are predictors of individual earnings levels and
earnings growth.6 Second, the effect of children is estimated after controlling for
differential entry earnings and differential returns of work experience (squared) for
fathers-at-some-point compared to childless men. This approach controls for dif-
ferences in earnings paths, namely if fathers started on different (higher) earnings
paths to childless men. Hence, these controls potentially reduce the omitted variable
problem. None of the studies in the literature addresses this point.
3 Background, data and summary statistics
3.1 Background
As a background for our analysis, we provide a brief overview of the main features
of the Norwegian labor market relevant for our analysis of men’s earnings during
the period 1975 to 2005. The Norwegian labor market is characterized by centrally
coordinated wage bargaining and high wage compression. Internationally, Norway
ranks high in terms of gender equality and family friendliness during recent decades.
Gender wage gap indicators show a quite stable difference of 15 percent in Norway,
6This resembles findings in the literature on the return to education showing that pre-market
education predicts wages and wage growth.
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which is low compared to Germany and the US (20-23 per cent), for example.7
Male labor force participation is high and men typically work full-time, which is
defined during recent periods as working 37.5 hours per week. Female labor force
participation is also high by international standards, but a number of women with
young children work part-time. Norway underwent a severe recession during the
period from 1987 to 1993, with unemployment peaking at 67 per cent in 1993.
It has been a long-standing policy goal in Norway to achieve high gender equal-
ity and help families to combine having children and work. The main policies to
achieve these goals have been anti-discrimination laws introduced during the 1970s,
parental leave and child care. Parental leave was first introduced in the 1970s, and a
major reform took place in 1993 when leave was extended to 42 weeks at full com-
pensation, while four weeks were reserved to the father (paternity leave). Prior to
1993, virtually no fathers took leave, but almost 80 percent of mothers took the max-
imum amount.8 Since 1993, the proportion of fathers taking up leave has steadily
increased from an initial 30 percent to almost 60 per cent in 1998. During paternity
leave, men receive a wage replacement up to a cap. During the 1970s, publicly
funded child care programs were expanded for 3 to 6 year old. Between 1990 and
2006, child care programs were also expanded to full coverage for 1 to 2 year olds.
Norway has a relatively similar family policy program to the other Scandinavian
countries.
3.2 Data description and summary statistics
The panel data for sibling and twin men born between 1955 and 1965 is extracted
from Norwegian registry data for the period from 1975 until 2005. We focus on
these birth cohorts to ensure that we can observe the complete individual earnings
7These are the unadjusted gender wage gaps reported by Eurostat and the US Census.
8The remaining women were not eligible. Workers are eligible if they have been working for 6
out of 10 months before the date of birth.
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and employment histories from first entry into the labour market, and fertility his-
tories. The Norwegian multi-generational birth registry was used to match sibling
and twin brothers to each other and their offspring. The sample of brothers includes
the population of men born between 1955 and 1965 who were the first- or second-
born son within a family with the same mother and father.9 The sample of twins
includes the population of twins of the corresponding birth cohorts. Fraternal and
monozygotic twins are included but cannot be distinguished in the data.10
Pulling from a data set dating back to 1967, we generate work and earnings
histories from first entry into the labor market. This ensures that we measure entry
earnings accurately for every individual in our sample. The main outcome vari-
able is the logarithm of real annual earnings that we use to measure earnings from
work.11 We deflate earnings by the Norwegian consumer price index (1998 = 100).
Earnings are excluded for workers younger than 20 years of age, as they may still be
in education. We also exclude observations with very low earnings (earnings less
than the annually adjusted basic income according to the social security system).
Years of experience are measured as the cumulative number of years with earnings
above the yearly basic income. We calculate this from first entry into the labor mar-
ket, as well as from first childbirth. We merge age and years of education to the
data. We generate a variable measuring the birth order within the family, which we
use as a control variable in our earnings regressions.12
From the birth registry, we obtain the complete record of the timing of offspring
9This means that we keep the main group but exclude sons from one-child families, as well as
those from families with fewer than two boys.
10Statistically, approximately 30 percent of all twins are monozygotic. Only monozygotic twins
are genetically 100 percent identical at birth. Siblings are genetically more similar than two ran-
domly selected men.
11The earnings variable measures all taxable earnings, including unemployment insurance, dis-
ability benefits, parental leave, and sick pay, but not means-tested social assistance and interest on
financial assets.
12We keep information on birth order within the family, counting both girls and boys. Birth order
effects have been documented with Norwegian data in Black et al. (2005).
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and the complete number of offspring for every man, counted by 2005.13 Note that
fathers are reported in the birth registry when they are cohabiting with or married to
the mother. In the estimations, we will mostly focus on the effect on the outcome
following the year of the first childbirth, which will be referred to as the ‘post birth
period.’ For supplementary results, we also use the birth year of the second and third
child. Our main group will be fathers-at-some-point, which includes all men for
whom we observe a first child in the birth registry at some point in the observation
period. The group of men without any children in the birth registry are denoted as
childless men, namely those who will never have children.
We assume that virtually all births for the cohorts in the analysis samples are
counted, since men in the sample are followed over most of their life cycle, that is,
until they are 50 years old, and the youngest cohort until they are 40. Approximately
20 per cent remain childless by the year 2005, according to the data. National sta-
tistics show that the fraction of childless men only declines by 2 percentage points
between the age of 40 and 45, and by 0.6 percentage points between 45 and 50.14
We use information on marital status to restrict the comparison group of child-
less men to men who are childless but married-at-some-point.15 Childless men
may be a very heterogeneous group, and childless men married at some point may
be more similar to fathers-at-some-point at the beginning of their working career.
Some of those who married may have planned to become fathers but for some rea-
son did not realize such a plan.16 Data on marital status is available for the period
1986 to 2005 and used to construct an indicator for being married at some point
(until 2005). We define married-at-some-point as equal to one if a man is ever re-
13The birth registry is complete, with the exception that the father is not reported if the mother
does not want to report him. One birth cohort is around 60,000 in Norway. During the observation
period, only 400-500 children were adopted per year and we have no information about those.
14The distribution of the number of children in our sample is reported in the Appendix in Table
A1.
15We do not have access to information on cohabitation for men without children. Hence, we may
exclude too many men by this rule.
16In our empirical analysis, we have to assume that this is not due to health problems.
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ported as married, divorced or separated, and zero otherwise. In order to disentangle
whether earnings increases are related to children17 or marriage, we also construct
a control variable based on the same information concerning whether a man is mar-
ried in period t. Hence, for fathers-at-some-point, we can control for whether the
couple is married before, at or after childbirth. For childless married-at-some-point
men, we can control for potential changes in earnings after the time of childbirth.
Tables 1 and 2 here
Tables 1 and 2 report the sample means and standard deviations for the main
variables separately for fathers-at-some-point, the comparison group childless men
and the restricted comparison group of childless men married-at-some-point. The
unconditional difference in mean log earnings between fathers and childless men
is 17 per cent for the sample of brothers and 15 per cent for the sample of twins,
when we pool all observations across the entire observation period. Compared to
childless men, men with children acquire slightly more years of education, and
work less. Differences become smaller when we compare fathers to childless men
married at some point.
4 Empirical Framework
We assume that the log earnings, ln yift , for individual i, in family f, and calendar
year t is given by:
lnyift = taift + 
0Xit + 
0Zift + f + if + wift (1)
where aift is equal to one from the time a person first enters fatherhood, and zero
otherwise, Xit includes controls for years of education and experience (squared)
17The father is reported on the birth certificate if he is married to or cohabiting with the mother.
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counted since entry into the labor market, Z contains the indicator variable equal
to one if the man is a father-at-some point and its interaction terms with years of
experience (squared) since entry. The error term contains three components: an un-
observed family fixed component, f , capturing genetically inherited ability18; an
individual varying and family-varying unobserved component, if , capturing unob-
served ability and genetic traits that vary across individuals and families; and uift
capturing other idiosyncratic variation (or luck).In addition, in the empirical estima-
tion, we control for birth order effects capturing that first or second born brothers
within a family differ in birth order rank, as well as time-varying factors,  t, captur-
ing macroeconomic shocks.19 We assume thatE(wiftXit) = 0 andE(wiftZift) = 0
for all i, f and t.20 The key parameter is the marginal effect of having children, t,
and to make it more flexible, we allow the effect to be a non-linear function in aift
and post-birth work experience, expost :21
t(ai; ex) = t11(a = 1)it + t2(expost)it + t3(ex
2
post)it:
As a baseline, we estimate the earnings regression by ordinary least squares And, to
follow the literature, we present fixed effects (FE) estimations exploiting the panel
structure of the data and within individual variation.22
18Since we cannot distinguish identical twins from fraternal twins we cannot use their comparison
to disentangle nature and nurture effects. Another reason why we want to control for family fixed
factors is that they are potentially correlated with fertility outcomes if, for example, families pass
on fixed values to their offspring that are important traits for having a family later in life (Fernandez
and Fogli, 2006).
19As a supplement, we show that the earnings equation can be derived in a treatment framework
as suggested in Heckman and Hotz (1998). See Appendix B.
20We follow the common assumption in the literature, but acknowledge that it might be restrictive
to assume no reserve causality. Identification depends on this assumption for both the family fixed
estimator and the individual fixed effect estimator. Only instrumental variable estimators can be
employed to relax this assumption.
21This may capture time varying costs of children, or effects through further children.
22Since individual fixed effects (FE) sweep out all time constant variables, it cannot identify the
differential effect of entry earnings between the group father-at-some point and childless men. FE
will give a consistent estimate of  if a and w are uncorrelated. A common concern with this type
of model is that estimates are biased if past earnings affect current fatherhood status.
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Our main estimation results rely on the covariance estimator (CV)(Bound and
Solon, 1999), which applies ordinary least squares to the regression of the between-
siblings differences in log earnings in every period on the between-siblings differ-
ence in the children variables, holding other between-sibling differences constant.
It exploits the cross-sectional variation for identification. If we assume 1f = 2f 23,
then the transformed regression can be written as:
(lny1ft lny2ft) = t(a1f a2f )+0(X1ft X2ft)+0(Z1ft Z2ft)+(w1ft w2ft)
(2)
The between-sibling difference is always formed by subtracting the variable of the
second-born brother in family f from the variable of the first-born brother in family
f .
Variation used to identify the parameters  and t comes from sibling pairs
where one sibling has children and the other does not. To identify , we need vari-
ation in a, which is independent of Z; that is, we need to observe men in the group
of father-at-some-point before they actually become a father.24 This highlights the
value of the data in which we observe the complete employment, earnings and fer-
tility histories for the selected cohorts and completed fertility for every man in the
sample. We also need that a and Z are uncorrelated with w.
The advantage of our approach is that when we compare two men from the
same family (same mother and same father), they are more similar in terms of the
unobserved component than two randomly selected men from the population. How-
ever, this comparison may still lead to a biased estimate of the effect of children in
23Since we cannot make use of data on monozygotic twins, we cannot sweep out the  completely
and therefore have to make assumptions. We also tested whether 1f = 2f = 0. We tested
for second and third order serial correlation of the error term from the model in between-sibling
differences, observing that serial autocorrelation remains, yet is small. The correlation coefficients
are 0.085.
24At the individual level, i, all combinations of Z and a are observed, except for the combination
Z = 0 and a = 1, i.e. childless man after becoming a father
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our model, since we cannot claim that 1f is exactly equal to 2f when we use
all brother pairs. We can still reduce unobserved heterogeneity problems by using
within family variation, if the family fixed factor is correlated with fertility out-
comes. If family environment is also related to parenting skills and these differ
between brothers who are very different in age, we can more accurately control for
family fixed effects when the siblings are more similar in age. Possible reasons why
brothers who are very different in age vary relatively more in terms of family back-
ground than brothers born only one year apart could be that parents are in different
career phases, may differ in terms of time and monetary resources or have different
experience duration in parenting. We take advantage of our large sample and run
separate regressions on sub groups of brother pairs who are more similar in age.
Naturally, twins are exactly equal in terms of age and parenting skills.
In addition to the estimation results, we provide statistics on the correlations of
fertility, estimates on sub-samples to explore the importance of family fixed effects
versus composition effects, the bias by a comparison of OLS, FE, as well as the
series of CV estimates.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 The mean effect of having children
Table 3
In Table 3, we present the estimation results of the effect of having children on
earnings estimated by OLS, FE and CV (covariance estimator). The table shows the
key coefficients on the effect of children in the lower panel, while all coefficients of
the control variables are shown in the two upper panels. The parameter estimates
of the auxiliary variables have the expected signs and sizes. The OLS estimates on
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the pooled sample of brothers (column 1) show that the conditional effect of having
children on earnings at birth is 7.3. and quite large and positive. The marginal
post-birth effect in experience is U-shaped and tends to increase.
When we estimate the model by individual fixed effects, the coefficients of
the variables of having children (column 2) decrease compared to the OLS coef-
ficients.25 The shift parameter right at birth decreases by more than a third. The
marginal effect post-birth is convex and becomes zero around 2.8 years after first
childbirth, before remaining negative across relevant values of experience.
Column (3) in Table 3 reports the results from the covariance estimator (CV) on
the same sample, whereby all brother pairs are pooled.26 They show that earnings
significantly increase in the birth year of the first child, but now the point estimate of
the shift right after childbirth is 6.4 percent. The marginal effect post-birth is slightly
U-shaped, but increasing. For illustration, the model estimates show that 14 to 35
percent of the simple OLS estimated effect of children one year after childbirth is
due to positive selection on fixed family-specific and fixed individual unobserved
factors. Selectivity on fixed family-specific factors appears significant but relatively
small when we use variation from all brother pairs.27
Siblings might still be quite heterogeneous in terms of family background,
which may introduce bias and thus make family fixed factors appear less impor-
tant. Siblings are genetically more similar than randomly selected men, but are not
genetically identical, unlike monozygotic twins. Siblings also differ due to differ-
ences in the timing of parenting (nurture). Parents’ skills and resources develop
over time, and the older sibling in our sample is 3.5 years older at the mean.
25For all fathers-at-some-point, earnings are observed before having a child.
26Summary statistics for the variations in between-sibling differences are also presented in Table
A2 in Appendix A, showing that the variations in differences between siblings and twins are still
large enough.
27The coefficients of the pre-birth differential effects between fathers-at-some-point and the group
of childless men reported in the upper panel of Table 3 are quite large and significant. This suggests
that fathers-at-some-point start on higher growth earnings paths than childless men.
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In order to control for the potential timing of parenting differences between
siblings, we re-estimated the regressions on the sub-samples of brothers who are
born two years or less apart and one year or less apart (see Table 3 columns (4) and
(5)). Results using the twin sample completely remove effects due to age differences
(see column (8)). Gradually reducing the age differences between brothers leads to
a reduction in the coefficients measuring the effects on post-birth earnings of having
children. The effect on earnings of having children right after childbirth declines to
+4.0-4.1 per cent, from an initial +6.4 per cent. From the second year after birth,
the effect remains constant.28 When twins are used, the effect post-birth declines
even further. The adjustment of earnings post-birth is now a constant shift of 2 per
cent, but is not significant.
The decrease in the effect of children in this model is driven by the fact that
using twins allows us to control for time effects, family fixed effects and age in the
best way, given that they are born in exactly the same year.29 Note that the mean pair
is now genetically more similar, because some twins in the sample are monozygotic
and hence genetically identical at birth.30 The F-test shows that estimates from
brothers one year different in age, or less, and twins are jointly significantly different
(Table 3 column 5 compared to column 8).
We explore further reasons why the effect of children remain relatively large
for the sample of brother pairs only one year, or less, different in age compared to
twins. First, we use childless men married-at-some-point as an alternative compar-
ison group.31 The summary statistics on mean earnings and education show that
28Only the coefficient of the experience squared variable is significant in column 4, but it is eco-
nomically small.
29All of the estimates using childless men as the comparison group reveal significantly larger
returns to experience of fathers-at-some-point compared to childless men even before first entry into
fatherhood. CV on the twin sample shows that entry wage differentials remain quite large.
30We cannot tell whether the genetic component drives our results since we cannot distinguish
between fraternal and monozygotic twins in our data.
31The twin sample would become substantially smaller when we further restrict them, which is
why we explore the following factors using brothers excluding twins.
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men in the group fathers-at-some-point are indeed more similar to childless men
married-at-some-point than to all childless men. Table 4 columns 1 and 3 report the
new estimation results using the restricted comparison group. The size of the effects
post-birth do not change significantly compared to the results in Table 3 columns 2
and 5.32
Table 4 here
We also want to test whether the estimates are driven by childbirth or relatively
more by marital status. Following the literature, we therefore add a control variable
for actually being married. We run these regressions again using the samples of
brothers and the restricted comparison group, since the samples of twins would
become too small. Note that men in Norway typically marry after becoming a
father. As shown in Figure 1, approximately 3 out of 4 couples get married close to
the time of first childbirth or later in our sample.33
Figure 1 here
The estimation results reported in Table 4 columns 2 and 4 show that adding
a control for being married only slightly reduces the size of the effect on earnings
of having children.34 Looking at the regression results in Table 4 column 4 for
brothers who are only one year different in age, the effect of children is 3.2 per-
cent and economically constant. These results confirm that the larger part of the
estimated positive effect of having children remains after we account for marriage,
32The coefficients of the pre-birth differential effects between fathers-at-some-point and the re-
stricted group of childless men reported in the upper panel of the table are now much smaller than
those reported in Table 3, but are still significant. This suggests that the large differences found in
Table 3 are driven by childless men who are never married and perform worse.
33Note that since marital status is only available since 1986, we have a slight over-reporting of
unmarried men in the pooled sample.
34Technically, all men not married at childbirth but reported in the birth register are cohabiting.
Therefore, the effect of children is the joint effect of post-first childbirth and cohabiting. However,
note that the results now show that, before birth, fathers-at-some-point are on very similar earnings
paths to the restricted group of childless men. Hence, even if some men already cohabit before hav-
ing children, the effects possibly related to household specialization or selection into the fatherhood
group at least seem quite small. This pattern is in line with recent time use data for Norway (See
Appendix C Table C1).
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(28 percent=1-(0.032/0.044)*100).35 The relatively small effect of marriage can
also be seen from Figure 2, where the simulated earnings profiles of a hypotheti-
cal father-at-some-point is plotted, comparing the two estimates with and without a
control for being married. These results appear plausible in the context of a Scandi-
navian society where gender equality is high and marriage traditionally takes place
after the first childbirth. Married and cohabiting couples are treated equally under
Norwegian law, including tax laws.
Figure 2 here
It is also possible that the effects after the first childbirth capture the effects of
second or further births. In extension, we add dummy variables and the correspond-
ing interaction terms with experience (squared) for second and third births to our
preferred model. We re-estimated the model for the brother sample used in Table
4 column 4. As seen from Table A3 in the appendix, our previous results remain
unchanged and the effects after the second and third birth are not significant.36
5.2 Discussion of the estimation approach
It might be surprising that fertility and fixed family factors are correlated, given that
fertility choices are made relatively late in life. For comparison, it has been widely
shown that educational choices taken relatively early in life are highly correlated
with family fixed factors, as well as highly correlated between siblings and twins
(e.g. Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998). As we can see from Table 5, fertility outcomes
35In this calculation, we ignore the curvature parameters, since they are virtually zero.
36As an additional test of the robustness of our findings, column 3 in Table A3 reports results
when we drop earnings following births that took place during the period when paternity leave was
available. In 1993, four weeks of parental leave were reserved to fathers for the first time, which
led to the effect that some fathers interrupted work for an additional month. In order to ensure that
potential negative earnings effects through interruptions related to becoming a father do not affect our
findings, we ran regressions on a restricted sample. As can be seen, the main results are unchanged.
For studies on the paternity leave reform, see Rege and Solli (2010). Table C2 in Appendix C reports
the complete replication results on the restricted sample.
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in our data are significantly correlated between siblings and correlation coefficients
are quite large, at between 11 per cent and 24 per cent. The correlation between two
randomly selected men from the population is zero. By comparison, the correlation
in years of education for twins is 51 percent and hence, as expected, is higher.37
Table 5 here
Identification applying the covariance estimator depends on sibling pairs where
one brother has children and the other does not. At the mean in our sample for broth-
ers, 27.94 per cent of all siblings have the combination ‘no children’ and ‘children’,
whereas 73.06 percent of brothers either both have children or both have none. For
twins, the corresponding values are 25.73 and 74.27. The panel of graphs in Fig-
ure 3 plots the percentage of pairs for whom both brothers have children or neither
has children separately across years, years of education and years of experience.
The proportions are constant across years, which is reassuring for our identification
strategy.
Figure 3 here
It is possible that sibling pairs that identify the effect of having children in the
family fixed effects model estimates are different from the random sibling pair in
our sample, which could drive the results. In order to investigate this possibility, we
present means and standard deviations for the sample of sibling pairs where only
one sibling has children and the other does not (unequal fertility outcomes). The
means of the main characteristics presented in Table 6 are very similar to those of
the entire sample. For illustration, we also investigated whether fertility patterns and
their correlations with education are different for the total sample and the restricted
sample of sibling pairs. As Figure 4 shows, the patterns are very similar at all levels
of education, except at very high levels of education where observations are few.
37Our results appear in line with evidence from the demographic literature that has shown in-
tergenerational transmission of fertility patterns. This automatically leads to a correlation between
siblings.
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Figure 4 here, Table 6 here
The corresponding regression results shown in Table 7 tend to confirm that
our previous results are not driven by sample composition. However, we note a
shift in the levels of the estimate of the post-birth effect; both the OLS estimate
of the effect of having children and the CV estimate are lower than the estimates
reported in Table 3. The shift post-childbirth now is 1.2 percent, and increasing by
0.5 percent per year. Only the slope coefficient is significant.
Table 7 here
As shown in Table 3, FE and CV both indicate an upward bias of ordinary least
squares, although the point estimates are very different. One reason might be that
the FE and CV transformations of the main equation sweep out different sources
of variation. The estimates may represent complementary findings. The FE model
sweeps out all time-constant unobserved and observed variables using the panel.
The CV model takes differences cross-sectionally between siblings in every period
of the life-cycle and then applies OLS, conditional on the set of controls. The large
sample allows us to control for family fixed factors in great detail and in various
ways, which we consider an advantage over individual fixed effects.
5.3 Summary of the main results
The empirical analysis leads us to conclude that accounting for family fixed factors
in earnings regressions to estimate the effect of children is a fruitful alternative
estimator. Our preferred estimation employs the covariance estimator on flexible
earnings regressions and use data from twins.
When we recall the FE and CV estimation results on the pooled sample, we
observe that they give a non-linear U-shaped effect post-childbirth. In case of FE,
this implies that the marginal effect will turn negative after 2.8 years, and it is not
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quite clear what mechanism can explain this pattern. The non-linearity could be
related to the age of the child, although the effect should rather be the opposite
in this case. The age of the child could capture the decreasing intensity of home
production or increasing consumption. In both cases, the effect of children should
rather increase over time. Therefore, we expect the marginal post-child effect not to
be decreasing.
The estimation results from CV concerning brothers who are one year different
in age, or less, as well as twins, give effects that remain constant after entry into fa-
therhood. Estimates of the mean effect of the first child for brother pairs very similar
in age range between 3.2 and 4.4 percent, with both estimates significant at common
significance levels. We prefer the lower estimate that controls for marriage. When
we use twin pairs, the estimated effect is 2 per cent, but is not significant.
In Norway, almost all women took paid parental leave between 24 and 42
weeks after childbirth and return to work afterwards during the period of obser-
vation. Therefore, it is not clear whether parental leave in itself translates into per-
manent changes, such as an adjustment of fathers’ labour supply. To analyze this in
further detail, longitudinal time series information on household activities would be
useful, as well as other information on partners’ careers.38
The comparison of the family fixed type of estimation results show compelling
evidence that family background matters for estimating the effect of children. Since
we can control for time fixed effects, family fixed effects and individual fixed effects
in the best manner by using twins, we prefer these estimates. The estimate from
twins may also still contain small effects through marriage if we extend the results
on brothers close in age to twins. We can reject the hypothesis that the effect is
38We also tested whether labour supply adjustments, such as working more than 35 hours of work,
may contribute to the positive effect post-birth that remains in Table 3 column 5. Estimating the same
regressions as for log earnings but replacing the dependent variable, we find small effects through
increased hours of work, as well as not consistent findings for employment with a plant. See for the
complete results Appendix C Table C3.
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driven by further children. We conclude that the earnings effect of children for men
is not significantly different from zero. This is an estimate of the mean effect of
entry into fatherhood post first childbirth.
The estimation results from twins allow us to conclude that the OLS estimates
of the effect of children on men’s earnings are upward biased and family sorting is
an important contributing factor. Accordingly, individuals with relatively high val-
ues of the family-specific factors are becoming fathers, which drives the estimated
effect of children upwards. We already see this bias if we use brothers close in age.
To illustrate the bias, Figure 5 plots the simulated profiles for fathers-at-some-point
for those who become a first-time father after five years in the labor market and who
are working continuously. A comparison of the predicted log earnings using OLS
(Table 3, column 1) and CV (Table 4, col. 4) reveals that OLS over-estimates earn-
ings of fathers compared to childless men; calculations show that the upward bias
is approximately 20 percent around the year of childbirth. Hence, between-family
differences account for a substantial amount and men with children have relatively
high values of these components.
Figure 5
6 Conclusions
In this study, we estimate the effect of children on earnings for men using Norwe-
gian registry data on employment, earnings and fertility histories for cohorts of men
born between 1955-1965 who can be matched to their brother. We present a series
of individual fixed effects and type-of-family fixed effects estimation results, which
also control for differential entry earnings and returns to experience pre-birth.
We find a non-significant effect of children on earnings of 2 per cent per year
when only using twins for estimation. This result puts Norway at the lower end of
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the scale of estimates found in the economics and sociological literature. Since ed-
ucation is free in Norway, parents do not need to save for their children’s education,
most women work39 and parental leave is paid. Taken together, this suggests that
the labor supply responses are expected to be smaller in Norway than in the US, for
example. Indeed, our results are consistent with this hypothesis.
The evidence in this paper adds to the debate about the sources of the gender
wage gap. The conventional wisdom is that having children has a negative effect on
mothers’ earnings and a positive effect on fathers’ earnings, which suggests that, all
other things being equal, the redistribution of household time and time spent with
children would potentially reduce the gender wage gap through a decrease of the
premium to men. The results in this study highlight that the observed child pre-
mium for men is an upward biased estimate of the direct effect of children on men’s
earnings. Hence, potential effects through redistributive policies at the household
level are potentially less effective than would be expected from observed gender
wage gap and family gaps. Therefore, the answer to the question posted in the title
is ‘yes’ for the average man.
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Figure 1: Timing of marriage and rst childbirth, own calculations using the
sample of all brothers followed from 1986 to 2005.
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Figure 2: Predicted earnings using estimates of the post-birth e¤ect without
(Tab. 4 Col. 3) and with a control (Tab. 4 Col. 4) for being married Note:
For illustration a man is used who is continuously working for 5 years since rst
entry into the labour market, is then entering fatherhood and continues working
until 30 years of work experience are completed.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for sibling brothers: Means and standard deviations
fathers-at-some-point childless men childless men
married-at-some-point
mean sd mean sd. mean sd.
log(earnings) 12.42 .52 12.25 .52 12.33 .51
real annual earnings (1000 Nkr) 267.3 271.3 219.8 153.6 237.5 154.0
yrs of education 12.28 2.47 11.90 2.59 12.04 2.54
age 33.61 7.18 33.11 7.16 33.88 7.29
age at rst marriage 30.32 4.41 34.66 6.00 34.47 6.01
age at rst birth 28.35 5.47 . . . .
number of children 2.38 .95 0 0 0 0
year rst job 1982 2.81 1982 2.96 1980 3.30
yrs of experience 13.57 7.13 12.64 7.07 13.53 7.20
yrs of experience before rst birth 1.82 3.81 12.64 7.07 13.53 7.20
year of birth 1960 2.98 1960 2.98 1959 3.03
Year of birth rst child 1988 6.39 . .
Year of birth second child 1991 6.05 . .
married-at-some-point 0.81 0.39 0.20 0.4 1
number of obs. brothers 1461807 272249 51351
Data: Norwegian register data 1975 until 2005.  available since 1986.
Pooled sample of rst and second born brothers, excluding twin brothers, born between 1955-65.
In total 1,734,056 observations and 45345 sibling pairs.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for twin brothers: Means and standard deviations
fathers-at-some-point childless men childless men
married-at-some-point
mean sd. mean sd. mean sd.
log(earnings) 12.38 .51 12.23 .52 12.35 .45
real annual earnings (1000 Nkr) 250.4 192.4 211.2 146.8 228.5 147.7
yrs of education 12.11 2.48 11.70 2.50 11.12 2.18
age 33.22 7.51 32.78 7.44 33.45 7.75
age at rst marriage 30.74 4.37 34.73 5.41 34.73 5.41
age at rst birth 28.47 5.39 . . . .
number of children 2.33 .98 0 0 0 0
year rst job 1980 3.57 1981 3.79 1979 3.14
yrs of experience 14.25 7.45 13.25 7.30 14.69 7.63
yrs of experience before rst birth 2.16 4.12 13.25 7.30 14.69 7.63
year of birth 1959 3.21 1959 3.23 1958 3.02
Year of birth rst child 1988 6.54 . . . .
Year of birth second child 1991 6.15 . . . .
married-at-some-point 0.81 0.39 0.20 0.4 1
number of obs. twin brothers 36218 8230 1515
Data: Norwegian register data until 2005.  available since 1986.
Pooled sample of rst and second born twin brothers born between 1955-65.
In total 44448 observations and 1069 twin pairs.
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Table 5: Correlations of education and completed fertility between siblings
Years of whether children number of
or not children
education 1 if yes
Brothers, all 0.3567* 0.1128* 0.1325*
Number of sibling couples 45345 45345 45345
Brothers, < 3 yrs age di¤erence 0.3697* 0.1169* 0.1335*
Number of sibling couples 18256 18256 18256
Twins .5170* .2420* .2402*
Number of sibling couples 1069 1069 1069
2 randomly selected men .002 -.009 -.003
Number of random couples 20000 20000 20000
* signicant at 5 percent signicance level.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for sibling brothers: Means and standard deviations
fathers-at-some-point childless men
mean sd. mean sd.
log(earnings) 12.35 .525 12.22 .53
yrs of education 12.16 2.5 11.91 2.64
yrs of experience 12.50 7.01 12.15 7.0
Only sibling couples with unequal fertility outcome (children yes or no).
Table 7: Testing compositional e¤ects: Earnings regression results only using brother couples
with unequal fertility outcome (0/1)
(1) (2)
OLS CV
less than 2 years
age di¤erence
years of education 0.044 0.033
(0.001) (0.001)
experience 0.074 0.067
(0.002) (0.003)
experience2 -0.002 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Di¤erential e¤ect in entry earnings and experience
father-at-some-point 0.038 0.038
(0.011) (0.011)
experience *father-at-some-point 0.009 0.009
(0.002) (0.002)
exerience2*father-at-some-point -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
E¤ect of children (post rst childbirth)
post-birth 0.041 0.012
(0.009) (0.013)
experience post-birth -0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.002)
experience2 post birth 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations/Pairs 64364 32182
R2 0.314 0.093
All regressions control for birth order- and time e¤ects.
The control group includes all childless men.
Standard errors are clustered at the sibling couple level and reported in parentheses.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Appendix
Appendix Table A1: Distribution of total number of children of a person, in 2005
Number of children Birth Cohorts 1955-65 Birth Cohort 1955
All men Brothers Twins National Statistics, men*
zero children 19.46 19.03 21.78 16.6
one child 13.94 13.65 14.80 13.2
two children 36.64 36.15 35.04 37.1
three children 23.37 22.96 20.57 23.3
four or more 8.14 8.21 7.82 9.9
Total 100 100 100 100
*Source: Statistics Norway.
Appendix Table A2: Summary statistics: Variables in di¤erences=Xfirstborn  Xsecondborn
Brothers Twin Sample
mean sd mean sd.
 log(earnings) .09 .59 -.02 .52
(father type) .02 .51 -.00 .50
 yrs of education .05 3.19 -.04 2.75
 yrs of experience 3.00 3.39 .00 2.45
.. experience squared 84.47 113.25 .37 80.61
 yrs of experience*fathertype 2.74 7.90 -.00 7.90
... experience squared*fathertype 75.22 178.42 -.29 176.95
(post birth) .12 .57 -.01 .54
 yrs of experience*post-birth 2.49 6.76 -.23 6.14
.. experience squared *post-birth 48.73 138.89 -4.66 125.60
Di¤erence in year of birth -1.16 .41 0
Number of observations 867028 22224
Appendix Table A3: Earnings regression results, brothers 1 year age di¤erence: Number of children
CV CV CV
education 0.02676 0.02673 0.02295
(0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00219)
experience 0.04881 0.04854 0.04511
(0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00663)
experience2 -0.00083 -0.00081 -0.00065
(0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00023)
Di¤erential e¤ect in entry earnings and experience
father type separated into
= 1 child -0.02372 -0.01646 -0.03061
(0.03531) (0.03532) (0.03696)
= 2 children 0.02551 0.02188 -0.00061
(0.03430) (0.03430) (0.03602)
= 3 children 0.02211 0.02156 -0.00022
(0.03453) (0.03453) (0.03632)
= 4 children 0.01383 0.01233 -0.00399
(0.03599) (0.03603) (0.03775)
more than 5 children -0.03835 -0.04191 -0.06173
(0.03904) (0.03920) (0.04097)
experience*father-at-some-point 0.01061 0.01082 0.01641
(0.00568) (0.00568) (0.00615)
experience2*father-at-some-point -0.00043 -0.00045 -0.00069
(0.00020) (0.00020) (0.00022)
E¤ect of having children
post-birth 1st child 0.02982 0.03090 0.03867
(0.00738) (0.00793) (0.00970)
experience post-rst birth -0.00189 -0.00213 -0.00391
(0.00180) (0.00255) (0.00295)
experience2 post-rst birth 0.00019 0.00009 0.00015
(0.00008) (0.00012) (0.00014)
post-birth 2st child 0.00274 -0.00042
(0.00753) (0.00869)
experience post 2nd birth 0.00336 0.00459
(0.00257) (0.00292)
experience squared post 2nd birth -0.00000 -0.00001
(0.00015) (0.00016)
post-birth 3st child -0.01292 -0.00871
(0.01017) (0.01150)
experience post 3rd birth -0.00308 -0.00427
(0.00286) (0.00308)
experience squared post 3rd birth 0.00034 0.00039
(0.00017) (0.00018)
Observations 99917 99917 82747
Comment sibling couples sibling couples exclud ing earn ings
less than 2 years di¤ less than 2 years di¤ fo llow ing a ch ildb irth if a fter 1993
R2 0.03929 0.03991 0.03803
Extended specication of Table 4, column 3, is estimated. For furhter explanations see Table 4.
Appendix B: Derivation of empirical framework
This appendix shows how the earnings equation in eq(1) can be derived in a treat-
ment framework as in the study by Heckman and Hotz (1998) that estimated the
return to training using non-experimental data. One issue in their application is that
those who enter training, the treated, are different before treatment compared to the
non-treated, those who do not enter training. This is a similar setting to ours where
we want to account for that fathers-at-some-point are on different earnings paths
from the beginning of their career in comparison to childless men.
Let ln yift be observed logarithmic earnings of individual i in period t, and ln yit
the logarithmic earnings in the absence of children. (We add subscript for family f
which we return to later.) The indicator variable aift equals one if a person becomes
a father (treated) and zero otherwise (untreated) and t is the effect of children in
period t. We assume that the effect of children is identical for all persons. The
period of childbirth is denoted as k. Then we can write:
lnyift = lny

ift + taift; aift = 1; t > k (1)
lnyift = lny

ift; ai = 0; t <= k
We will focus on estimating the mean effect and the difference in mean post-birth
earnings of fathers and non-fathers is:
E[lnyiftjaift = 1]  E[lnyiftjaift = 0] (2)
= E[tjaift = 1] + fE[lnyiftjaift = 1]  E[lnyiftjaift = 0]g;
The expression in parentheses is the selection bias which is present if the assignment
to fatherhood is not random.1
Suppose lnyit is a linear function of a set of observed characteristics Xit and
unobserved characteristics it.
lnyift = Xift1 + ift (3)
1Since men typically work continuously non-random selection into work is not important and
we can neglect this issue. To incorporate women with more disruptive careers would make the
estimation approach more complicated.
1
Then observed earnings may be written as
lnyift = Xift1 + taift + ift (4)
In the empirical application the vector X contains a constant and standard controls
for years of education and experience (squared) counted since entry into the labor
market. We assume that E(itXit) = 0 for all i and t.2
The decision to become a father can be quite generally written in terms of an
index-function framework, where the index, father, is a function of both observed,
Z, and unobserved, u, characteristics:
fatherift = Zif + uift (5)
Then, the ith individual’s fatherhood status is
aift = 1 iff fatherift > 0 (6)
= 0 otherwise (7)
We assume u is iid across individuals and distributed independently of Zi. This
means that the dependence between  and a can arise because of dependence be-
tween Z and , i.e. selection on observables, or dependence between  and u, selec-
tion on unobservables.
Men who become fathers at some point may have invested already previously
more into their careers. In this case, omitted variable bias may arise.3
To address selection bias on observable characteristics we employ a linear con-
trol function estimator. Inserting a linear version of E(jX;Z)4 in equation (4)
yields
lnyift = Cift + taift +~ift (8)
where Cift denotes the vector of all variables included in either X or the vector
of instruments Z, ~it = it   E(jai; Ci) = it   E(itjCi). In our application
2The effect of children, t = t(a; expost), is modelled as a function of the indicator variable
ai and post-birth work experience, expost, in order to capture the potential non-linear pattern of the
effect after the first childbirth.
3Clearly, the direction of selection bias can go either way.
4We use that E(ja;X;Z) = E(jX;Z). In this case controlling for the observed selection
variables (Z) solves the (observed) selection bias problem.
2
Z will include the indicator variable whether the man is a father-at-some point,
fathertype, or not. We exploit the fact that in the data we observe earnings even
before a man becomes a father, and that we can distinguish fathers-at-some point
from childless men. Additionally, we use the indicator interaction with years of
experience (squared) since entry, ex.
In sum, we write the log earnings equation:
lnyift = taift + 
0Xit + 
0Zift + f + if + wift (9)
where we write the error term ~ift = f + if + wift, and where individuals are
indexed by i, and family by f, and time by t.
Reference: Heckman, J.J. and V.J. Hotz (1989): Choosing among alternative
non-experimental methods for estimating the impact of social programs: The case
of manpower training, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 84(408),
862-874.
3
Appendix C
Appendix Table C1: Time use of men and women per day, 2010
Market Work Household work
Single men, 24-44 yrs old 8.24 2.12
Single women, 24-44 8.24 2.22
Couple without child, 16-44
Men 8.58 2.38
Women 8.04 2.4
Single parent
men 7.47 4.19
women 7.32 4.17
Couple with child age 0-6
Men 8.45 4.29
Women 7.29 5.57
Collected from O.F. Vaage (2012): Tidene skifter: Tidsbruk 1971-2010,
Statistics Norway, Oslo Kongsvinger.
Couples include married and cohabiting couples.
Numbers disaggregated by parenthood status are not available before 2010 from this report.
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Appendix Table C3: Linear Probability Model results for employment and hours of work
All1 Restricted Comparison Group2
Employment More than Employment More than
30 hours work 30 hours work
years of education 0.018 -0.003 0.018 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
experience 0.021 0.006 0.015 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
experience2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Di¤erential e¤ect in entry earnings and experience
father-at-some-point 0.060 0.004 0.014 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.005)
experience *father -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
-at-some-point (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
experience2*father 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
-at-some-point (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Di¤erential e¤ect of children (post rst childbirth)
post-birth 0.013 0.008 0.002 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
experience post-birth -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
experience2 post birth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1655259 1655259 697224 697224
R2 0.021 0.007 0.025 0.005
All regressions control for birth order and time e¤ects.
1 All means all fathers-at-some-point and all childless men.
2 Restricted Comparison Group uses only childless men married at some point as comparison group.
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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